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European  Union  countries  face  a  comparable  set  of  socio-economic  challenges:  from 
rationalization  of  the  welfare  systems  and  generation  of  economic  growth  and 
employment, to absorption of immigrant communities and the granting of legal rights to 
minorities with alternate life-styles. Despite these general similarities, a striking feature 
of  politics  in  Europe  is  the  diversity  of  political  competition  present  in  its  political 
systems.  While  in  some  countries  political  contest  occurs  primarily  over  economic 
policy,  the  political  debate  in  others  centers  on  issues  such  as  protection  of  national 
culture and state sovereignty.  
 
This paper aims to address how political competition can be theoretically comprehended, 
and what accounts for the variance in the content of European political contestation. To 
answer these questions, this paper builds on spatial theory of political competition, and 
develops two additional concepts: political space and axis of competition in the opening 
theoretical section. The second section of this work turns to the empirical expression of 
the axis of competition in Europe. The third section serves as a demonstration of the 
conceptual framework. It performs a multinomial logit analysis on individual vote choice, 
linking the variation of competition axes to electoral competition.   
  
The paper argues for understanding political competition in the light of political space 
and axis of competition. It emphasizes that the particular content of competition stems 
from  the  interaction  of  supply  and  demand  factors,  the  interplay  between  individual 
preferences  and  party  strategies.  There  is  a  connection  between  the  nature  of  party 
competition expressed by the slope of the competition axis and the particular issues that 
individual voters consider when selecting a political party. Consequently, where party 
competition unfolds along an economic dimension, voters consider major political parties 
on the basis of their economic inclinations, while where political contest occurs along a 
social  dimension,  social  issues  play  a  more  significant  role  in  vote  choice for  major 
parties. Minor parties, somewhat marginalized in the political system, seek to highlight 
other issues, competing for votes along secondary dimensions or non-policy issues.  
  
I. Conceptualizing Political Space and Axis of Competition    
 
1. Political Space and Axis of Competition  
A schematic systematization of political competition has been initially conceptualized by 
spatial theory (Hotelling 1929, Downs 1957). This theory depicts political contest in uni-
dimensional  terms  as  a  single  continuum  on  which  each  point  denotes  a  specific 
preference position. This allows one to represent the positioning of different political 
actors such as individuals, social groups, party activists and political parties (Aldrich 
1983, Chappel and Keetch 1986, Cox 1990, Strom 1990). It assumes that each actor has a 
defined utility function over the given issue, which has a single maximum ideal point, 
outlining the most preferred policy position. These ideal maxima of individuals can be 
aggregated  into  a  distribution  of  ideal  points  (Aldrich  1983:  957).  Individuals  are 
assumed to prefer positions, which are closer to their ideal point. Political actors thus 
compete for the support of individuals by placing themselves on particular positions, so 
as to attract the greatest following possible.   
   3 
While  this  theoretical  simplification  has  been  useful  in  depicting  and  understanding 
political conflict in strategic terms, it lacks the ability to address the particular ideological 
character  of  political  competition.  The  structure  of  the  uni-dimensional  space  is 
secondary and is merely assumed for the purposes of analyzing the strategic interaction 
among  actors.  As  a  result,  spatial  analysis  places  political  conflict  into  a  generic 
dimension  commonly  termed  ‘left-right,’  without  addressing  its  content.  More 
importantly,  spatial  theory  atomizes  political  competition  into  incomparable  uni-
dimensional spaces. It addresses the interplay of political actors along a continuum, yet 
this continuum is not placed in a wider spatial context. The resulting strategic analysis 
may  prove  similar  across  different  political  systems,  while  concealing  extensive 
differences in the political substance contested. This denies the capacity to compare – so 
central to political analysis. 
 
To  better  understand  the  content  and  nature  of  political  contestation,  I  propose  to 
conceptualize political competition with the aid of two concepts: political space and axis 
of competition. These concepts borrow from spatial theory by assuming that politics is 
structured  around  political  issues  over  which  individuals  hold  particular  preferences, 
which can be aggregated into ideal maxima, and actors such as parties compete for their 
support.  Diverging  from  classical  spatial  theory,  these  concepts  assume  no  particular 
distribution  of  ideal  points,  permitting  skewed  or  bi-modal  preference  curves.  Most 
importantly, these concepts relax the uni-dimensional conception of politics by allowing 
small-n dimensions of political competition.  
 
Political space describes the landscape of political issues which are contested in a given 
society.  It  outlines  the  particular  political  issue-components,  which  arise  in  various 
political systems, and thus delimits the dimensions of the ideological arena in which 
political parties can position themselves and compete for support. Due to its capacity of 
outlining party positioning, it retains the ability to depict strategic competition among 
parties,  while  simultaneously  providing  a  comparable  ideological  backdrop  by 
summarizing the dimensional structure in a particular political system.      
 
The axis of competition
1 is the political pathway along which contending interests collide.  
It is a theoretical aide in the location of political competition in political space. It is a path 
of political conflict over the political landscape of a given society – a line of political 
interaction between political actors. As such it is a summary of the main fault line in a 
society,  which  anchors  political  competition,  highlighting  the  structure  behind  spatial 
positioning of political parties. Parties may position themselves throughout the political 
space of their polities, exploiting the bounds of all possible dimensional combinations. 
Or,  parties  may  seek  to  connect  various  dimensions  by  aligning  along  a  particular 
dimensional  arrangement.  The  axis  of  party  competition  outlines  the  particular 
correlation  between  the  standing  dimensions  as  political  actors  contest  them.  The 
competition axis is not created intentionally. It is rather a byproduct of the interaction 
between  individual  partisan  ideologies  and  strategic  considerations,  leading  to  an 
unintended  equilibrium.  Since  competition  axes  are  expressions  of  the  particular 
                                                 
1 This concept was introduced without detailed conceptualization by Kitschelt (1994), and is developed in 
Marks, Hooghe, Nelson and Edwards (2006).    4 
ideological competition structure of given societies, they can be meaningfully compared 
across cases.  
 
Figure 1. Axis of Competition in two-dimensional Political Space  
In the left panel, parties position themselves in all four quadrants of two-dimensional political space. There 
is no correlation between dimension X and Y and no discernible axis of party competition. In the right 
panel, parties align along a competition axis, which depicts the correlation between dimension X and Y.  
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2. Political Competition and Dimensionality 
Political space – the stage for political conflict – outlines the important political issues 
and their dimensionality in a particular society. It is in this space where parties take 
positions,  paving  the  competition  axis  as  a  path  of  political  contest.  A  path  not 
collectively premeditated, but rather gradually treaded out by self-regarding actors.  
 
It is important to inquire further into what determines the structure of political space and 
how particular dimensions of political conflict are created. I propose an answer which lies 
in  the  interaction  between  political  demand  and  political  supply.  Political  space  and 
competition axis are on the one hand defined by the demand rooted in social interests and 
divides over political concerns. On the other hand, they are also shaped by the supply 
embodied in the strategic responses of political parties who represent and exploit these 
rifts.  
 
All politics begins with issues – basic concerns of citizens. Theoretically speaking, there 
exists almost an infinite number of political issues, which concern individual members of 
society. These are the basic preferences determining citizens’ views on particular policy 
options, such as: the level of taxation, severity of punishment for violent crimes, the 
extent of rights that various minorities get to enjoy and so on. Individuals hold varying 
position over these issues, and their aggregates produce various preference distributions. 
This emphasizes Sartori’s point about the ‘disjointed’ nature of political space (Sartori 
1976: 343), where some individuals or political actors, which have relatively proximate 
positioning,  nevertheless,  find  each  other’s  preferences  unacceptable,  which  can  be 
depicted by steeply changing preference distribution curves.     
   5 
In addition to positioning, individuals care about different issues with different intensity.
2 
Salience – measuring the importance of a given issue – is thus modeled as a weight of a 
particular position on the issue continuum, which can again be aggregated to derive an 
overall salience of a given issue. A political actor has only a finite amount of salience, 
which can be distributed over a number of different issues. Individuals – given their 
bounded cognitive capacity – can thus care about and political parties – given their finite 
political and financial resources – can publicize only a restricted number of issues, with 
the allocation of salience across these issues representing a zero-sum tradeoff. 
 
Cleavages appear on issues on which large number of individuals holds different views, 
while assigning relatively significant salience levels to it. Cleavages thus represent deep 
and long-standing rifts in society (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), which are manifested by 
social rootedness and political organization.
3 Daalder underlines that cleavages need not 
be characterized only by sharp distinctions in positioning, where two adversarial groups 
stand  on  opposing  sides  with  a  valley  of  empty  space  between  them  (a  bi-modal 
distribution).  On  the  contrary,  many  political  divisions  can  and  do  have  meaningful 
intermediate (centrist) positions (Daalder 1984: 104). As such, the particular distribution 
of aggregated individual positions on salient and divisive issues provides a panorama of 
social interest, representing the demand for political solutions.   
 
Political parties respond to this political demand. Through its appeals to voters and the 
development  of  a  political  program,  a  party  aggregates  political  interests.  These  are 
collected firstly on the basis of the party supporters’ proximate positioning on individual 
issues, and secondly across different issues which party followers care about. This leads 
to the creation of coherent parcels of political values. This development of simplified 
political packages is synonymous with the creation of political dimensions. Dimensions – 
the bundles of issues on which actor positioning is more or less tightly correlated – which 
are the unintentional consequences of partisan struggle for political support, are thus the 
building blocks of political space.  
 
The interaction between citizens’ political demands based on their issue preferences, and 
parties seeking to represent them, leads to the creation of political space through the 
inadvertent  development  issue  dimensions.  These  dimensions  create  the  political 
landscape in which parties position themselves to compete for votes. This positioning by 
which  parties  seek  to  maximize  their  individual  utilities,  potentially  results  in  the 
formation of a competition axis.  
 
Political parties, however, enjoy formative powers over the structure of political space, 
since they are the actors that direct the translation of political issues into dimensions. 
When aggregating political issues into dimensions, a political party faces an inherent 
tension.  On  the  one  hand,  a  party  seeks  to  reflect  and  voice  the  diversity  of  salient 
                                                 
2 The concern with ‘intensity’ of interest on a given issue is adopted from the directional voting model 
(MacDonald and Rabinowitz 1989, MacDonald Listhaug and Rabinowitz 1991). Although this model 
proposes an entirely different conceptualization of political space, it provides a solid argument for the need 
to incorporate salience. 
3 For a ‘lighter’ understanding of cleavages see Zielinski 2002: 189.   6 
political issues, which leads it to formulate an increased number of distinct and tightly 
associated political packages (made of very highly correlated issues), thus inducing an 
increase in the dimensionality of political space. This is strategically advantageous for the 
party since augmented dimensional complexity  allows for greater ideological nuance, 
which  enables  the  party  to  differentiate  itself  from  other  competitors,  and  to  tap 
specialized interest support. 
 
On  the  other  hand,  such  disaggregation  increases  political  complexity,  leading  to 
considerable  costs  to  a  political  party.  Firstly,  convolution  of  political  space  through 
increased  dimensionality  entails  cognitive  costs  to  a  party,  which  needs  to  track  or 
develop positioning along multiple continua. This ultimately restrains the party’s function 
as  a  political  simplifier.  Secondly,  increased  dimensionality  introduces  systemic 
instability. It provides multiple planes of party competition, making equilibrium positions 
increasingly difficult – if not impossible – to reach. Systems with high dimensionality can 
thus be expected to be systems of greater flux, which defeats a party’s aim of achieving 
and  maintaining  power.  Finally,  increased  dimensionality  introduces  heightened 
campaign  costs.  Parties,  like  most  organizations,  are  entities  with  histories,  having 
developed  their  structures,  identifications  and  reputations  over  time.  (Marks  and 
Steenbergen  2002:  881-2)  A  party  is  likely  to  be  ideologically  and  organizationally 
invested in specific positioning on distinctive dimensions.  The rise of a new dimension 
or a change in the aggregation of issues within a standing dimension leads to loss of 
recognition of the party’s positioning, and increases costs associated with the need to 
divert salience to the new dimensions. Also, newly emergent dimensions my reconfigure 
the  bundling  of  political  issues  in  such  a  way  that  an  incumbent  party  finds  itself 
internally divided on certain issues. Clearly, if such issues carry significant salience, the 
unity  of  the  party  becomes  seriously  jeopardized.  As  a  result,  each  political  party  – 
especially an established one – prefers to maintain a stable dimensional configuration of 
political space.  
 
The dimensional structure of political space thus exerts varying impact on different types 
of political parties. A party established in a given set of dimensions benefits from the 
status  quo.  The  dimensions  revolve  around  issues  on  which  this  party  has  clearly 
articulated positions and a recognized record, which serves as a carrier of its ideological 
image.  Such  a  party  focuses  on  defining  political  conflict  through  the  prisms  of  the 
standing dimensions – dimensions that provide it with stable electorates, as well as a 
predictable  set  of  coalition  partners  (Strom  1990:  585).  Conversely,  a  party  that  is 
marginal on the predominating set of political dimensions – thus representing infrequent 
positioning on the relevant issues – endures reduced power in the system. This party 
musters limited number of votes and suffers from reduced bargaining capacity in the 
system (Strom 1990: 585). Its best strategic option is to exploit new issues on which its 
(mainstream) opponents might have no determined positions, or – even better – which 
may internally divide the opposing camps (Daalder 1984: 100).  
 
As  a  result,  political  competition  is  a  struggle over  the  dimensional  configuration  of 
political  space,  determining  the  content  of  political  debate,  as  well  as  the  political 
crevices in which different parties may dwell. A political party tries to manipulate the   7 
dimensional structure to its advantage.
4 Particularly, a marginal party attempts to invest 
salience into new issues that are orthogonal to the standing dimensions of political space 
(Meguid 2005). This essentially reorganizes the structure of political space, increasing its 
dimensionality, and thus escalating the potential for specialized parties. This relates to 
Sartori’s ‘centrifugal competition’, where extreme parties seek to ‘tear the system apart’ 
(Sartori  1976:  350).  Such  strategies  force  the  mainstream  parties  to  react  by  either 
ignoring the new issue, or in case it does garner significant salience among the electorate, 
to try and translate it into the standing set of dimensions. The mainstream parties are thus 
strategically interested in adjoining the new issue into the structure of current dimensions. 
This is only possible if the ideal point variation on this issue is distributed in such a way 
that it correlates with the issues currently contained in the predominant dimensions, or, if 
the new issue is indeed orthogonal (and thus no correlation exists) the established parties 
have the strategic capacity to align this issue with the traditional dimensions forcibly. If, 
however, the new issue drives a crosscutting wedge inside the mainstream parties, they 
may splinter along this issue, which eventually becomes an additional dimension.  
  
 
 
II. Political Space and Axis of Competition in Europe  
The structure of political conflict in Europe has been primarily theorized by Lipset and 
Rokkan  (1967),  who  argue  that  contemporary  political  competition  in  Europe  results 
from  successive  incorporations  of  divisive  concerns  stemming  from  national  and 
industrial revolutions, which have occurred on the continent in the past centuries. The 
authors argue for the fundamental role of the cleavage splitting workers versus owners, 
which has had a strong homogenizing effect on European polities (Lipset and Rokkan 
1967:  35,  47).  In  recent  decades,  the  internationalization  of  production  and  capital 
                                                 
4 For an example from American politics see Miller and Schofield (2003).  
Table 1. Determinants of Political Space Dimensionality 
Political Demand 
Social Factors 
Individual Preference Distribution 
-  Modality 
o  if more than one mode, the deeper the rift  
-  Variance 
o  the greater the variance, the deeper the rift 
Issue Correlation  
-  ceteris paribus the more issues on which individual positioning 
correlates, the lower the dimensionality  
Political Supply  
Partisan Factors 
Response to Demand 
-  Preference Distribution and Correlation  
o  Parties respond to aggregate preference distribution over 
dimensions  
Relation to other Suppliers (parties)   
-  Distance  
o  Parties aim to distinguish themselves from other 
competitors. They seek to distance themselves on at least 
one dimension  
Dimension Construction 
-  the more a new issue correlates with established ones, the easier its 
translation into standing dimensions    8 
markets has undermined the capacity of governments to coordinate markets and to ensure 
sufficient  levels  of  national  investment.  This  has  in  turn  led  to  slowing  growth  and 
increased unemployment, placing strain on public finances and undermining the solvency 
of welfare systems (Huber and Stephens 2001: 318). Similarly, the changing structure of 
production, shifting from industrial manufacturing towards a service oriented economy, 
has  differentiated  economic  stratification  and  altered  the  capacity  of  labour 
representation. De-industrialization has thus induced the re-emergence of distributional 
issues  on  the  political  agenda  (Iversen  in  Pierson  2001:  78-9).  Consequently,  the 
changing structure of economic production has deepened a rift between the skilled and 
educated who have improved their capacity of social, as well as geographic, mobility and 
those with lower education and skills who face increasing socio-economic uncertainty 
and limited capacity of exit. Distributional conflict has thus defined the economic nature 
of the prime dimension of European political space. 
 
Although few would question the central role of economic conflict in European politics, 
recent scholarship has outlined the growing impact of non-economic factors on political 
competition. Due to pervasive stabilization of political and economic regimes, leading to 
unprecedented  levels  of  general  affluence  and  increasing  social  ‘embourgeoisement,’ 
mobility  and facilitated  access  to  information,  the  tenacity  of  class  conflict  has  been 
somewhat dulled. Post-war generations expressed increased interest in  self-expression 
and  in  issues  pertaining  to  life-quality  and  life-style  rather  than  to  material  concerns 
(Dalton, Beck and Flanagan 1984: 15-18, Inglehart 1984, 1997). Recent decades have 
also seen the rise of threats to individual and group identity. The changing ethnic makeup 
of European societies resulting from persistent levels of immigration from the third world 
has placed emphasis on questions of national culture and identity. The visible presence of 
minorities and minority cultures in most Western European societies has fuelled intense 
debates  concerning  the  level  to  which  immigrant  cultures  should  integrate  into  the 
predominant  culture,  polarizing  the  society  between  those  favouring  cosmopolitanism 
versus  assimilation.  In  a  different  vein,  ongoing  European  integration  with  its 
simultaneous  increase  of  the  powers  of  supranational  institutions  in  Brussels  while 
devolving some decision-making towards the regional level has engendered questions 
concerning  the  role  and  sovereignty  of  the  European  national  state.  Contemporary 
developments have thus ignited a virulent political rift on issues related to general social 
concerns, emphasizing the two-dimensional nature of European politics.  
 
Consequently, scholars have defined contemporary European party competition in two-
dimensions generally spanning from economic redistribution to market allocation on the 
one hand, and from libertarian or alternative politics to authoritarian or traditional politics 
on the other (Kitschelt 1992, Hooghe Marks and Wilson 2002, Kitschelt 2003, Marks 
Hooghe Nelson and Edwards 2006, Kriesi et .al. 2007). These authors further contend a 
linkage between these dimensions, whereby in Western Europe redistributive economic 
positioning  corresponds  with  socially  liberal  politics  –  thus  outlining  an  axis  of 
competition.  In  Eastern  Europe,  where  opposition  to  communist  redistributive  and 
authoritarian rule has structured post-communist politics, the same dimensions exist. The 
axis  of  competition  has,  however,  the  opposite  slope,  linking  traditionalism  and 
authoritarianism with the economically redistributive left (Vachudova and Hooghe 2006).   9 
 
Quantitative data yields striking confirmation of the postulated relationship between the 
two  major  dimensions  and  the  differences  between  the  regions  of  Europe.  The  2002 
Chapel  Hill  Expert  Survey  underlines  the  consistent  structure  of  party  competition. 
Firstly, political parties do not seem to place themselves ‘randomly’ within the political 
space, but rather along a discernible competition axes which link the positioning on the 
two dimensions. Secondly, while in Western Europe the competition axis has a negative 
slope,  in  Eastern  Europe  the  axis  runs  in  the  opposite  direction  (see  Marks  Hooghe 
Nelson and Edwards 2006, Vachudova and Hooghe 2006).  
 
Figure 2. Political Space and Axes of Party Competition in Europe   
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Dimension  X  –  Economic  Left-Right,  Dimension  Y  –  Green/Liberal/Alternative  politics  versus 
Traditional/Nationalist/Authoritarian  (see  Hooghe  Marks  and  Wilson  2002).  Line  fit  is  based  on  OLS  regression, 
weighted by party vote. This is a replication of results reported by Vachudova and Hooghe (2006).   10 
 
The generalized quantitative expression of the axis of party competition emphasizes the 
diverse character of the political contestation in different European countries. While the 
Czech, Greek, Latvian and Swedish party systems seem to compete predominantly along 
the economic dimension (their competition axes have a flat slope), the party systems of 
Austria, France, Spain, the UK and especially Hungary seem to compete predominantly 
along the social dimension (their competition axes have a steep slope).
5 This confirmed 
observation  begs  the  question:  why?  The  following  section  provides  one  test  of 
explaining the slope of the competition axis.  
 
Table 2. Slopes and Fit Measures of Competition Axes in Europe  
Estimates of are obtained using OLS regression. Significance is not reported since the aim is to obtain best line fit of 
the positioning of the population of parties. This is a replication of results reported by Vachudova and Hooghe (2006)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 The precise expression of the ‘flatness’ or ‘steepness’ of the competition axis is the absolute value of the 
axis slope, where a large absolute value suggests competition along the vertical (social) axis, while a small 
absolute value suggests competition along the horizontal (economic) axis.  
  Unweighted model   Model weighted by vote 
Country  Adjusted R2  Slope   Root MSE   R2  Slope  Root MSE 
BE  0.444  -0.792  1.864  0.390  -0.678  2.026 
DK  0.174  -0.718  2.401  0.167  -0.385  2.082 
GE  -0.181  -0.218  2.255  0.162  -0.425  1.782 
GR  -0.482  -0.090  2.472  0.241  -0.464  1.691 
ESP  0.905  -0.881  0.500  0.974  -1.041  0.359 
FR  0.269  -0.724  2.186  0.598  -1.418  1.802 
IRL  -0.167  -0.186  1.927  0.219  -0.445  1.489 
IT  0.459  -0.802  1.513  0.402  -0.634  1.787 
NL  0.209  -0.641  2.607  0.386  -0.555  1.780 
UK  0.515  -0.777  1.440  0.920  -1.264  0.766 
POR  0.889  -0.930  1.040  0.932  -0.977  0.793 
AUS  0.357  -1.097  2.806  0.937  -1.283  0.902 
FIN  0.074  -0.544  1.996  0.263  -0.526  1.714 
SV  -0.067  -0.249  1.937  0.015  -0.073  1.587 
BUL  0.254  0.398  0.893  0.769  0.560  0.558 
CZECH  -0.073  0.313  2.386  0.229  0.290  1.954 
HUNG  0.783  2.858  1.440  0.666  3.549  1.796 
LAT  -0.126  0.112  1.448  0.007  0.032  1.081 
LITH  0.753  0.733  0.945  0.797  0.775  0.918 
POL  0.032  0.531  3.077  0.128  0.557  3.130 
ROM  0.746  0.964  1.160  0.697  0.926  1.406 
SLOVAK  0.007  0.313  1.946  0.141  0.338  1.781 
SLOVEN  -0.152  0.241  1.920  0.270  1.002  1.729   11 
III. Vote Choice and the Slope of Party Competition Axis   
 
1. Propositions and Hypotheses 
The  nature  of  political  competition,  and  thus  the  slope  of  the  competition  axis,  is  a 
function  of  political  demand.  Individual  preference  distribution  and  the  salience  of 
particular political issues serve as a popular level incubator for political conflict. As a 
result, decisions in the electoral marketplace – taken against the backdrop of the primary 
social cleavages – determine the pathway of political contestation. Parties respond to 
citizens’ concerns and position themselves in the political space in such a way, as to 
represent the popular preference and salience distribution. The competition axis slope 
thus results from the popular importance assigned to and variance on political issues.  
 
Consequently,  partisan  choice  for  the  major  contenders  in  elections  is  based  on  the 
predominant dimension of conflict as expressed by the axis of party competition slope. 
This is not to deny partial role of party identities in vote choice – that is, for example that 
social conservatism determines the vote for right-wing parties, whereas say positioning 
on issues of economic redistribution predicts the vote for the center-left. However, the 
particular structure of political conflict of a society – the path of political interaction 
depicted by the slope of the  competition axis – reflects vote choice  across the party 
system. Voters tend to support the main political parties, those competing for government 
control, based on the consideration of the predominant dimension along which domestic 
conflict runs. 
 
These causes for party axis slope are further reinforced by political strategies of parties. 
The effects of partisan co-existence in political space are not uniform across political 
actors.  Major  mainstream  parties,  who  are  likely  to  have  longstanding  roots  in  the 
society, as well as organization apparatuses and linkages within political institutions, face 
much higher sunk costs of reputation and identity creation. It is these parties that strive 
for  the  Lipset-Rokkanian  ‘freezing’  of  party  systems  along  a  stable  competition  axis 
inhabited by strategically sluggish actors (see Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 50). Since these 
parties  are  likely  to  be  the  historical  co-creators  of  the  character  of  their  domestic 
political space; since these parties are ideologically invested in the primary political fault 
lines (along which the competition axis runs); it is these parties that compete along the 
predominant dimensions of the political system.  
 
Hypothesis 1: The primary dimension of political conflict determines vote choice 
for major political parties. Where the axis of competition is steep, conflict over 
social issues determines the relationship between major parties and vice versa.  
 
Minor parties, on the contrary, suffer from reduced impact in the standing competitive 
construction of their political space. While the competition axis is a conduit for political 
skirmishes between the major parties, secondary political parties  seek to avoid being 
caught in the crossfire, and aim to step aside. As a result, they tend to stand further away 
from  the  axis  of  competition,  attempting  to  compete  on  more  peripheral  dimensions. 
Given the pervasiveness of the primary conflict, these parties are unlikely to not compete 
along the main dimension at all, but they face strategic incentives in emphasizing the less   12 
important dimension. The source of their political identity is the differentiation from the 
major parties along the inferior dimensions, or along non-policy issues, such as valence 
or anti-systemic orientation. Minor parties thus try to increase the salience of tangential 
issues,  which  may  distract  voters  from  the  primary  dimension,  thus  reducing  the 
dominance of major parties.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The secondary dimension of political conflict plays a greater role in 
determining vote choice for minor political parties. Where the axis of competition 
is steep economic conflict increasingly co-determines the vote for minor parties 
and vice versa.  
 
2. Analysis and Results  
In order to test the above hypotheses, I use data from the World Value Surveys (1999-
2002).  They  offer  a  useful  database  comprising  of  individual  level  observations, 
providing positioning on a large number of political issues such as the role of the state in 
the economy, justifiability of homosexuality or abortion, or the role of religion in society, 
as well as general socio-economic indicators, such as age, education, income or size of 
community  of  residence.  Importantly,  this  data  overlaps  with  the  Chapel  Hill  Expert 
Survey  data  –  used  for  the  above  derivation  of  the  structure  of  political  space  –  in 
temporal terms, making it a reasonable analytical pair. To address my propositions, I 
concentrate  on  the  cases  of  extreme  party  competition  axis  slope  on  the  European 
continent – both in Eastern and Western Europe. Due to space limitations, on constrain 
myself to analyzing four cases, two with a flat competition axis – Sweden and the Czech 
Republic, and two with a steep competition axis – Austria and Hungary.  
 
To assess the structure of the data, I initially perform principal factor analysis. I impose 
orthogonality of factors by performing varimax rotation. This produces factors, which 
can be easily analytically categorized. In Sweden, as well as in the Czech Republic, two 
principle  factors  emerge,  one  ‘economic’  –  related  to  the  role  of  government  in  the 
economy  and  individual  responsibility  –  and  another  ‘social’  –  related  to  issues  of 
alternative  lifestyles  and  religiosity.  In  Austria  and  Hungary  three  principle  factors 
emerge,  one  ‘economic’  pertaining  to  similar  issues  of  government  control  of  the 
economy, and two general ‘social’ factors where one is specifically related to the role of 
religion in society and the other to social-moral issues, such as homosexuality, abortion 
and  soft-drug  use.  These  resulting  factors  are  used  as  the  predictors  of  interest  in 
analyzing vote choice in the two countries. (See Appendix for factor loadings.) 
 
To  test  hypotheses  1  and  2,  I  perform  multinomial  logit  analysis  (MNL),  predicting 
individual  party  vote  choice  by individual  positioning  on  the  pertinent  factors  of the 
given country, while controlling for the effects of socio-economic characteristics, such as 
age, education, income and community size. I assess the distinctive factors behind vote 
choice for various major and minor parties, and to interpret these results I evaluate the 
change in vote probability for various parties as a function of the different factors.    
 
The results show that the estimated models provide a reasonable explanation of vote 
choice, providing Likelihood-Ratio tests significant at the .001 level. Interestingly, the   13 
models for Sweden and the Czech Republic have substantially higher pseudo R
2 (.2165 
and .1339) as opposed to the models for Austria and Hungary (.0969 and .0892). Despite 
the  differences,  all  of  these  values  are  somewhat  small,  suggesting  that  the  models 
explain only a limited portion of vote  choice variance. Although it is  surprising that 
issue-positioning  together  with  socio-economic  factors  provide  such  constrained 
explanation, it is likely that the weakness of the model stems from the omission of non-
policy issues such as the perception of politicians’ valence and subjective identification 
with a political party
6. In all cases, assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives 
seems to hold based on both the Hausman and the Small-Hsiao tests, suggesting the 
appropriateness of using a MNL model. 
 
In the case of Sweden, I estimate an MNL model using choice for five of the larger 
parties  of  the  2002  Swedish  parliamentary  elections  –  the  Moderaterna,  SAP, 
Folkepartiet,  Kristdemokraterna  and  Vänstrepartiet  –  as  the  dependent  variable.  As 
predictors I use individual positioning on the economic and social factors, which were 
derived from the factor analysis. To control for socio-economic characteristics, I add 
variables for age, level of education, capacity to save money in the past year, socio-
economic status and income level.   
 
Table 3. Multinomial Logit – Sweden  
  Vänstrep.  Folkep.  Moderat.  Kristdem. 
  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se 
Economic Factor  .7276***  -0.2253  -2.047***  -.9451** 
  -0.2182  -0.2872  -0.2694  -0.2981 
Social Factor  .8611**  -0.0040  -0.1242  -.7955** 
  -0.2628  -0.2876  -0.2206  -0.2480 
Age  -0.0134  -0.0066  0.0011  0.0100 
  -0.0119  -0.0128  -0.0102  -0.0127 
Education Level  0.0345  .5547***  .2680**  0.1918 
  -0.1071  -0.1435  -0.1003  -0.1210 
Saving Money  0.0843  -0.0645  0.0764  0.1180 
  -0.1921  -0.2528  -0.2054  -0.2353 
Soc-Econ Status  0.2832  -.8500**  -.7640***  -0.3735 
  -0.1933  -0.2781  -0.2101  -0.2371 
Income  -0.0309  -0.0410  0.0045  0.0607 
  -0.0728  -0.0809  -0.0686  -0.0854 
Constant  -1.4389  -1.7842  -0.7082  -2.5900 
  -1.1453  -1.3807  -1.1173  -1.3800 
Log-likelihood  -466.9700       
Chi2  258.0704       
Pseudo R2  0.2165       
Baseline  SAP       
N  401       
  *p<.05  **p<.01  *** p<.001  (two-tailed) 
 
                                                 
6 For the importance of these factors for political competition see Adams and Merrill (1999), and Adams 
(2001)   14 
The substantive results of the model generally support the posited hypotheses. The choice 
for the two major political competitors, the social-democratic SAP and the conservative 
Moderaterna, is primarily determined by economic issues.
7 The probability of voting for 
Moderaterna decreases by over 80% as individual placement on the economic factor goes 
from its minimal value (economic-right) to its maximal value (economic left). Similarly, 
the probability of vote for the SAP increases by over 25% as the positioning on the 
economic factor goes from extreme right to extreme left. Furthermore, the effect of the 
economic factor for the choice for Moderaterna and SAP is statistically significant vis-à-
vis  all  other  possible  choices,  emphasizing  its  impact  on  the  vote  for  them.  On  the 
contrary the effect of the social factor for these parties is very weak, resulting in only a 
small vote probability change of 2% and 11% respectively. It is also not statistically 
significant with respect to most other party choices (the exceptions are the Vänstrepartiet 
and Kristdemokraterna).    
 
Table 4. Vote Probability Change – Sweden 
  Vänstrep.  Folkep.  Moderat.  Kristdem.  SAP  Change 
Economic Factor  0.622  0.016  -0.820  -0.073  0.255  0.357 
Social Factor  0.311  0.025  -0.020  -0.429  0.113  0.180 
Age  0.079  -0.034  0.023  0.071  0.018  0.045 
Education Level  -0.058  0.209  0.154  0.038  -0.344  0.161 
Saving Money  0.016  -0.028  0.028  0.030  -0.046  0.030 
Soc-Econ Status  0.192  -0.147  -0.277  -0.045  0.277  0.188 
Income  0.030  -0.039  0.008  0.062  -0.001  0.028 
Maximum discrete probability change while other variables held at mean. Estimated by Stata’s ‘prchange’ command 
 
The results for the minor parties are much more varied. Some of these parties are clearly 
chosen for reasons of individual economic positioning. They are, however, also selected 
on  the  basis  of  other  features  –  suggesting  that  they  strive  for  competition  on  other 
dimensions. The radical-left Vänstrepartiet depends for its votes on individual positioning 
on economic issues, but placement on the social factor importantly codetermines the vote. 
It  is  statistically  significant  and  its  absolute  discrete  change  results  in  31%  of  vote 
probability  change.  The  confessional  Kristdemokraterna  relies  on  positioning  on  the 
social factor even more clearly. It is highly statistically significant between all categories 
and when positioning on it decreases from extreme social liberalism to extreme social 
conservatism, this results in a 42% increase in vote probability. Finally, the vote for the 
liberal  Folkepartiet  is  not  successfully  predictable  by  individual positioning  on  either 
factor, as both have very small substantive impact and are not statistically significant 
between most choice categories. The best predictor of vote choice for the Folkepartiet is 
age, which seems to suggest that this party markets itself more on the basis of non-policy 
issues such as youth-friendly dynamism.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 A Wald test leads to a sound rejection of the null hypothesis that neither factor has any effect on vote 
choice.     15 
 
Figure 3. Probability of Vote for Party by Factors – Sweden 
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Economic factor spans from extreme right to extreme left, social factor spans from socially 
      conservative to socially liberal. Generated with Stata’s ‘prgen’ command. 
 
The Czech Republic yields very similar results. I estimate an MNL model assessing the 
choice for the five parties represented in parliament in 2002 – ODS,  SSD, KS M, 
KDU- SL and US. My main predictors of interest are the social and economic factor 
generated by the factor analysis, and the included control variables are age, education 
level, socio-economic status, income and size of community inhabited.  
 
The two major Czech parties – the conservative ODS and social-democratic  SSD – 
clearly compete on economic issues. The vote choice for these parties is best explained 
by individual positioning on the economic factor. Total change on this factor from its 
maximum value (economic left) to the minimum (economic right), leads to an increased 
probability of voting for ODS by as much as 62%. On the contrary, the effect of the 
social factor is not significant vis-à-vis other choice categories, except the  Christian-
democratic KDU- SL. 
 
As in Sweden, the minor parties in the Czech Republic compete on a wider variety of 
issues. The Christian-democratic KDU- SL differentiates itself quite clearly on social 
issues,  where  a  total  increase  in  the  positioning  on  the  social  factor  (from  social 
conservatism to social liberalism) leads to a 41% lower probability of voting for KDU-
 SL.  On  the  contrary,  the  vote  for  the  liberal  US  cannot  be  determined  by  issue 
positioning.  The  most  significant  predictor  is  age,  where  change  from  the  oldest  (87 
years) to the youngest (17 years) respondent results in almost 28% increase in probability 
of voting for the party. This can be explained by US’s concentration on valence rather 
than policy issues, campaigning largely against the personality and leadership style of 
ODS chairman, Vaclav Klaus, and thus also attracting younger voters eager for change in   16 
political culture. The communist KS M is an interesting case. It competes on economic 
issues where a shift from the extreme economic right to extreme economic left leads to a 
54% vote probability increase for the party. The reason for why KS M competes in the 
main dimension, despite being a party slipping into marginality, is its original centrality 
in the system, the structure of which it has shaped. As the original communist monopoly 
party, KS M has been the political subject around which the fledgling democratic party 
system – and its axis of competition – evolved.  
 
Table 5. Multinomial Logit – Czech Republic 
  KS M   SSD  KDU- SL  US 
  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se 
Social Factor  0.1829  -0.0216  -1.3074***  -0.0591 
  -0.1684  -0.1281  -0.2050  -0.1532 
Economic Factor  1.5893***  1.019***  0.4349  0.2290 
  -0.1845  -0.1510  -0.2237  -0.1913 
Age  .0501***  .0136*  0.0006  -.0276*** 
  -0.0091  -0.0066  -0.0094  -0.0082 
Education Level  0.0108  .1578732*  0.0300  0.1470 
  -0.0858  -0.0658  -0.0972  -0.0763 
Soc-Econ Status  0.3884  .3806*  0.0478  0.1596 
  -0.2313  -0.1778  -0.2603  -0.2081 
Income  -0.0754  -0.0381  -0.0118  -0.0030 
  -0.0568  -0.0407  -0.0608  -0.0464 
Community Size  -0.0582  -0.0665  -0.0740  0.0854 
  -0.0557  -0.0435  -0.0638  -0.0537 
Constant  -3.9698***  -1.9730*  -1.6212  -1.1863 
  -1.1091  -0.8177  -1.2019  -0.9212 
Log-Likelihood  -1025.7660       
Chi2  317.1457       
Pseudo R2  0.1339       
Base Category  ODS       
N  790       
  *p<.05  **p<.01  ***p<.001  (two-tailed) 
 
 
Table 6. Vote Probability Change – Czech Republic 
  KS M   SSD 
KDU-
 SL  ODS  US  Change 
Social Factor  0.1113  0.1104  -0.4140  0.1615  0.0308  0.1656 
Economic Factor   0.5442  0.2580  -0.0443  -0.6213  -0.1365  0.3209 
Age  0.3685  0.0977  -0.0272  -0.1597  -0.2792  0.1864 
Education Level  -0.0432  0.1831  -0.0194  -0.1871  0.0666  0.0999 
Soc-Econ Status  0.0640  0.1817  -0.0287  -0.2055  -0.0114  0.0982 
Income  -0.0493  -0.0485  0.0055  0.0716  0.0206  0.0391 
Community Size  -0.0270  -0.0983  -0.0261  0.0555  0.0961  0.0606 
Maximum discrete probability change while other variables held at mean. Estimated by Stata’s ‘prchange’ command 
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Figure 4. Probability of Vote for Party by Factors – Czech Republic  
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Economic factor spans from extreme right to extreme left, social factor spans from socially 
      conservative to socially liberal. Generated with Stata’s ‘prgen’ command. 
 
Turning to Austria, I estimate an MNL model using choice for the four parties, which 
entered  the  Federal  Council  in  2002  –  the  SPÖ,  ÖVP,  FPÖ  and  Grünen  –  as  the 
dependent variable. I concentrate on the individual positioning on the three issue factors 
generated by the factor analysis – social-moral, economic and religious – as the main 
predictors. To control for socio-economic characteristics, I include variables of age, level 
of education, socio-economic status, income level and size of community inhabited.  
 
The results of the analysis are partly supportive of the hypotheses proposed. Vote choice 
for the two major parties – the social-democratic SPÖ and the Christian-democratic ÖVP 
– is interestingly determined by all three factors: social-moral, economic and religious.
8 It 
thus  seems  that  the  major  parties  compete  on  all  relevant  issue  dimensions  in  their 
system.  Clearly,  party  family  related  identities  play  a  role,  as  the  social-moral  and 
religious factors play a more pronounced role in the vote for the Christian-oriented ÖVP. 
As, for example, an individual’s positioning on the religious factor increases from its 
minimum value (secularism) to its maximum (religious orientation), the probability of 
voting for the ÖVP increases by over 42%. Conversely, for the SPÖ it is positioning on 
economic issues that determines its selection most strongly. Change from the minimum 
value on the factor (economic right) to the maximum value (economic left) increases the 
probability of voting for the SPÖ by almost 34%. Nevertheless, the positioning on all 
                                                 
8A Wald test leads to a sound rejection of the null hypothesis that neither factor has any effect on vote 
choice.   
   18 
three factors is statistically and substantively significant in the choice for these two major 
parties. 
 
 
Table 8. Vote Probability Change in Austria       
  Grünen  ÖVP  FPÖ  SPÖ  Change 
Social-Moral Factor  0.224  -0.525  0.002  0.294  0.262 
Economic Factor   0.231  -0.324  -0.137  0.338  0.231 
Religious Factor  0.016  0.426  -0.143  -0.299  0.221 
Age  -0.030  0.066  -0.255  0.218  0.142 
Education Level  0.195  0.153  -0.218  -0.130  0.174 
Soc-Econ Status  -0.047  -0.214  0.090  0.172  0.131 
Income  -0.011  0.040  -0.013  -0.015  0.020 
Community Size  -0.058  -0.107  0.117  -0.007  0.058 
Maximum discrete probability change while other variables held at mean. Estimated by Stata’s ‘prchange’ command 
 
 
Table 7. Multinomial Logit – Austria  
 
Baseline 
SPÖ     
Baseline 
ÖVP     
  Grünen  ÖVP  FPÖ  Grünen  SPÖ  FPÖ 
  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se 
Social-moral 
Factor 
.6181**  -.8925***  -0.2300  1.510***  .8925***  .6625*** 
  -0.2307  -0.1617  -0.1544  -0.2447  -0.1617  -0.1767 
Economic Factor   0.2329  -.4599***  -.3187*  .6928**  .4599***  0.1412 
  -0.2020  -0.1360  -0.1378  -0.2128  -0.1360  -0.1509 
Religious Factor  0.3478  .5413***  0.0720  -0.1935  -.5413***  -.4693** 
  -0.2167  -0.1437  -0.1599  -0.2147  -0.1437  -0.1583 
Age  -0.0187  -0.0050  -.0247**  -0.0138  0.0050  -.0197* 
  -0.0117  -0.0073  -0.0076  -0.0120  -0.0073  -0.0080 
Education Level  .4265***  0.1268  -0.0939  .2997**  -0.1268  -.2206** 
  -0.1025  -0.0683  -0.0737  -0.1049  -0.0683  -0.0769 
Soc-Econ Status  -0.5124  -.3953*  -0.0236  -0.1171  .3953*  .3716* 
  -0.2914  -0.1624  -0.1666  -0.2991  -0.1624  -0.1795 
Income  -0.0233  0.0192  -0.0017  -0.0425  -0.0192  -0.0209 
  -0.0657  -0.0437  -0.0453  -0.0674  -0.0437  -0.0482 
Community Size  -0.0075  -0.0491  0.0671  0.0416  0.0491  .1162* 
  -0.0639  -0.0465  -0.0452  -0.0665  -0.0465  -0.0502 
Constant  -1.4671  0.4171  0.8527  -1.8842  -0.4171  0.4356 
  -1.2402  -0.7528  -0.7876  -1.2614  -0.7528  -0.8245 
Log-likelihood  -737.388      -737.388     
Chi2  231.2421      231.2421     
Pseudo R2  0.1355      0.1355     
Base Category  SPÖ      ÖVP     
N  660      660     
  * p<.05  ** p<.01 
***p<.00
1  (two-tailed)       19 
The two minor parties – the radical right FPÖ and the green Grünen – seem to attract 
votes  less  on  policy  issues  measured  here,  but  rather  as  a  result  of  other  concerns. 
Considering  policy  positioning,  vote  choice  for  the  Grünen  is  most  importantly 
determined by economic issues, where maximum change in individuals’ positioning on 
this  factor  leads  to  23%  vote  probability  change.  The  economic  factor  is,  however, 
statistically significant only when considering a vote between the Grünen and the right-
wing parties – ÖVP and FPÖ). The vote choice between the SPÖ and the Grünen is more 
significantly determined by positioning on social-moral issues. The policy-based vote for 
the FPÖ is similarly determined by positioning on a combination of the economic and 
social-moral factors. In terms of policy positioning, voters differentiate between the FPÖ 
and the left-wing parties based on economic factors, while they chose to vote for the FPÖ 
over the SPÖ based on social-moral factors. More importantly, however, the vote choice 
for these minor parties is more decisively determined by non-policy issues. In the case of 
the  Grünen,  the  effect  of  education  level  is  substantively  and  statistically  significant 
across  all  baseline  categories.  As  education  increases  from  the  lowest  category 
(incomplete elementary education) to the highest (university degree), the probability of 
voting for the Grünen increases by almost 20%. The impact of non-policy issues is even 
more striking in the case of the FPÖ. The most pronounced predictors of vote for the FPÖ 
are age and education level. The vote for the FPÖ seems to come more from the young 
and the less educated. As age increases from the lowest recorded value (18 years) to the 
highest (87 years), the likelihood of voting for the FPÖ decreases by over 25%. Similarly, 
as education level increases from the lowest category (incomplete elementary education) 
to the highest (university degree), vote probability for the FPÖ drops by almost 22%.      
 
 
Figure 5. Probability of Vote for Party by Factors – Austria 
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Economic factor spans from extreme right to extreme left, social-moral factor spans from social 
conservatism to social liberalism, religious factor spans from secular to religious. Generated by 
                  Stata’s ‘prgen’ command.   20 
In Hungary, the results point in a similar direction. I estimate a MNL model predicting 
the vote choice for the four most significant parties in the political system in 2002 – the 
MSZP, Fidesz-MDF, SZDSZ and FKGP. I concentrate on the positioning on the three 
issue factors generated by the factor analysis – social-moral, religious and economic – as 
the main predictors, while controlling for age, education level, socio-economic status, 
income and size of community inhabited.  
 
As  in  Austria,  the  two  major  parties  in  Hungary  –  the  social-democratic  MSZP  and 
conservative Fidesz-MDF – compete on a combination of social and economic issues, yet 
the two social factors are particularly significant. If, for example, the positioning on the 
religious factor changes from extreme secular to extreme religious, the probability of 
voting for MSZP decreases by 41%, while a shift from extreme social liberalism to social 
conservatism on the social-moral factor increases the likelihood of voting for Fidesz-
MDF by 36%.  
 
 
Table 9. Multinomial Logit - Hungary 
  SZDSZ  Fidesz-MDF  FKGP 
  b/se  b/se  b/se 
Social-Moral Factor   0.2280  -.3616*  0.0526 
  -0.1991  -0.1636  -0.3334 
Religious Factor  1.060***  .4231**  .5827* 
  -0.2985  -0.1611  -0.2638 
Economic Factor  -0.6589  -.4349*  -0.1102 
  -0.3841  -0.1825  -0.3124 
Age  0.0031  -0.0117  0.0111 
  -0.0151  -0.0074  -0.0122 
Education Level  -0.0405  0.0014  -0.0267 
  -0.1534  -0.0709  -0.1332 
Soc-Econ Status  -0.0738  0.0216  0.0682 
  -0.3765  -0.1775  -0.3186 
Income  0.1724  0.0443  -0.0205 
  -0.1722  -0.0811  -0.1345 
Community Size  -0.0880  -0.0217  -.5295*** 
  -0.1099  -0.0505  -0.1190 
Constant  -2.7169  -0.0153  -0.5642 
  -2.0174  -0.9371  -1.6756 
Log-Likelihood  -374.9105     
Chi2  73.4407     
Pseudo R2  0.0892     
Base Category  MSZP     
N  381     
*p<.05  **p<.01  ***p<.001  (two-tailed) 
 
 
Of the two minor Hungarian parties, the vote for the liberal SZDSZ seems to be also best 
explained  by  positioning  on  the  religious  factor.  However,  like  for  minor  parties  in 
Austria, the vote for the agrarian FKGP is not predictable by issue-positioning at all. It is   21 
the size of the community inhabited that best predicts, where respondents from smaller 
localities are much more likely to support this party, underlining its rural character.    
 
Table 10. Vote Probability Change - Hungary 
  MSZP  SZDSZ  Fidesz-MDF  FKGP  Change 
Social Moral Factor  0.1766  0.1456  -0.3616  0.0393  0.1808 
Religious Factor  -0.4137  0.2073  0.1509  0.0554  0.2068 
Economic Factor  0.3259  -0.0675  -0.2722  0.0138  0.1699 
Age  0.1183  0.0181  -0.1899  0.0534  0.0949 
Education Level  0.0097  -0.0111  0.0100  -0.0086  0.0098 
Soc-Econ Status  -0.0132  -0.0106  0.0146  0.0091  0.0119 
Income  -0.1015  0.0600  0.0591  -0.0175  0.0595 
Community Size  0.1731  -0.0103  0.0649  -0.2277  0.1190 
Maximum discrete probability change while other variables held at mean. Estimated by Stata’s ‘prchange’ command 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Probability of Vote for Party by Factors – Hungary 
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Economic factor spans from extreme right to extreme left, social-moral factor spans from social 
conservatism to social liberalism, religious factor spans from secular to religious. Generated by 
                  Stata’s ‘prgen’ command. 
 
 
 
The results for countries with steep competition axes – Austria and Hungary – are not 
entirely consistent with the hypotheses set out above. They may, however, be logically 
interpreted in the light of my theoretical propositions. The somewhat indistinct results for   22 
the major parties in Austria – which seem to compete for votes on the basis of social as 
well as economic issues – are sensible. Although being relatively steep, the Austrian 
competition axis is not close to parallel to the social dimension (which would require the 
slope coefficient to approach infinity). While Austria and Hungary may present empirical 
extremes in the European context, they do not portray a theoretical extreme of polities 
competing  solely  along  the  social  dimension  –  the  way  that  Sweden  and  the  Czech 
Republic competes along the economic one. The mixed relevance of social as well as 
economic factors for the vote choice for major parties in Austria and Hungary is thus a 
realistic  representation  of  their  competition  axes,  which  slants  between  the  two 
dimensions. Furthermore, the fact that the minor parties seem to generally attract votes on 
the basis of non-policy rather than policy placement is also consistent. Since the major 
parties compete on a mixture of social and economic factors, the minor parties need to 
differentiate themselves on other issues. The Austrian Grünen thus strive for partially 
competing on being the party of the educated, while the anti-system FPÖ attracts the 
poorly qualified youth with bleak prospects, and the Hugnarian FKGP reaches out to 
voters in rural areas.   
 
 
IV. Conclusion  
This paper has argued for the usefulness of the terms political space and axis of party 
competition in the conceptualization of political conflict. Redressing the shortcomings of 
spatial  theory,  these  concepts  allow  the  representation  of  political  competition  in  a 
broader ideological perspective. The content of political competition – the political space 
– is derived with greater nuance, not limited to a single generic dimension, but allowing 
for small-n dimensionality. Consequently, the main line of political conflict – the axis of 
competition  –  is  contextualized  within  the  spatial  dimensionality,  allowing  for  the 
quantitative expression of its characteristics (slope and fit), which can then be compared 
across varying cases. This understanding is useful for the study of comparative politics in 
that  it  provides  a  summary  measure  of  political  competition,  which  may  be  used  in 
broader analyses.  
 
This  paper  has  demonstrated  the  applicability  of  these  concepts  by  concentrating  on 
contemporary party competition in European countries. Constructing a two-dimensional 
political space derived deductively from expert studies and placing political parties in it, 
has allowed the derivation of axes of party competition in different political systems of 
Europe. This exercise has subsequently outlined the broad variation on the slope of the 
axis of party competition, emphasizing that the nature of political conflict differs among 
European countries – with some competing predominantly along an economic dimension, 
while others compete more along a social dimension.  
 
Finally, this paper has addressed the variation of competition axis slope by studying the 
interplay between partisan and electoral politics. It has argued that where the competition 
axis slope is flat, main competition occurs along the economic dimension and voters 
chose major parties predominantly on the basis of economic considerations. Where the 
axis slope is steep, main competition occurs increasingly along the social dimension and 
major parties are more likely to be selected based on social-issue considerations. The   23 
results have broadly supported these claims. In Sweden and the Czech Republic, where 
the competition axes run distinctly along the economic dimension, the vote choice for the 
major  parties  is  rooted  in  economic  concerns.  In  Austria  and  Hungary,  where  the 
competition axes are much steeper, vote choice for the major parties is determined jointly 
by social and economic issues. This result is consistent with the theoretical logic of the 
argument. Since the Austrian and Hungarian competition axes run between the economic 
and social dimension (the slope is only relatively steep – not parallel with the social 
dimension), major parties compete on both dimensions. Minor parties in both countries 
compete more pronouncedly along secondary issues. The Czech KDU- SL, as well as 
the Swedish Vänstrepartiet and Kristdemokraterna increasingly appeal to voters on social 
issues, while vote for the Hungarian FKGP and the Austrian FPÖ and Grünen seems to 
be  best  predicted  by  non-policy  issues,  such  as  age,  education  and  community  size, 
suggesting that these parties attract voters on the basis of their agrarian, anti-systemic and 
alternative  identity  respectively,  rather  than  on  specific  policy.  This  emphasizes  the 
usefulness of the concepts of political space and axis of competition and portrays their 
meaningful description of political competition in Europe, allowing for differentiation 
and comparison. Simultaneously, however, these results highlight an important weakness 
of  this  conceptualization  –  its  incapacity  to  capture  competition  outside  of  policy 
prescriptions.    
   24 
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VI. Appendix – Factor Analysis 
 
SWEDEN 
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =      700 
    Method: principal factors                      Retained factors =        8 
    Rotation: orthogonal varimax (Horst off)       Number of params =       92 
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |     Variance   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
        Factor1  |      1.34102      0.17319            0.4133       0.4133 
        Factor2  |      1.16782      0.34214            0.3599       0.7732 
        Factor3  |      0.82568      0.06589            0.2545       1.0276 
        Factor4  |      0.75979      0.33550            0.2341       1.2618 
        Factor5  |      0.42429      0.36995            0.1308       1.3925 
        Factor6  |      0.05434      0.03383            0.0167       1.4093 
        Factor7  |      0.02051      0.01905            0.0063       1.4156 
        Factor8  |      0.00146            .            0.0004       1.4160 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(105) = 1423.86 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
 
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2   Factor3   Factor4   Factor5   Factor6   Factor7   Factor8 |   Uniqueness  
    -------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------+-------------- 
            b002 |  -0.1193   -0.0255    0.0110    0.5231    0.0169    0.0023   -0.0187   -0.0039 |      0.7107   
            b003 |   0.0527    0.1997    0.0960   -0.5479   -0.0803   -0.0112   -0.0144   -0.0041 |      0.6411   
            e037 |   0.5922   -0.0053    0.0596   -0.0984    0.0150   -0.0441    0.0363    0.0098 |      0.6325   
            e038 |   0.4959    0.0437   -0.0028   -0.0182   -0.2233    0.0774    0.0861    0.0023 |      0.6885   
            e039 |   0.5581   -0.0257   -0.0088   -0.0641   -0.0585   -0.0045   -0.0087   -0.0173 |      0.6799   
            e042 |   0.6086   -0.0429    0.0046   -0.0085    0.0217    0.0002   -0.0671    0.0033 |      0.6227   
            e143 |  -0.0804   -0.0921   -0.0155    0.2005    0.3681    0.0349   -0.0131    0.0019 |      0.8077   
            e145 |  -0.1741   -0.0545   -0.0730    0.1573    0.3361    0.0470    0.0489   -0.0079 |      0.8190   
            f028 |   0.0380    0.3189   -0.1843    0.1496    0.0393    0.0427   -0.0452    0.0277 |      0.8343   
            f103 |   0.0175   -0.0184    0.5995   -0.0093    0.0181    0.0164   -0.0235    0.0038 |      0.6387   
            f105 |   0.0223   -0.0795    0.6304   -0.0529   -0.0315   -0.0228    0.0197   -0.0035 |      0.5911   
            f118 |  -0.0174    0.6219    0.0119   -0.2031   -0.1139   -0.0541   -0.0002   -0.0002 |      0.5557   
            f120 |  -0.0175    0.6648   -0.0815   -0.0074    0.0189    0.0408    0.0030   -0.0008 |      0.5491   
            f122 |  -0.0663    0.3315   -0.0951    0.2003    0.0870    0.1646    0.0012    0.0020 |      0.8019   
            f126 |   0.0391    0.2541   -0.0233    0.0128   -0.3022    0.0923    0.0329   -0.0124 |      0.8321   
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Factor rotation matrix 
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 | Factor1  Factor2  Factor3  Factor4  Factor5  Factor6  Factor7  Factor8  
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------   27 
         Factor1 |  0.8309   0.1865   0.1485  -0.4109  -0.2889  -0.0208   0.0122  -0.0009  
         Factor2 | -0.2290   0.8949  -0.3437  -0.1011  -0.1185   0.0657  -0.0014   0.0042  
         Factor3 |  0.4454  -0.0959  -0.7270   0.4868   0.1479   0.0706  -0.0026   0.0063  
         Factor4 |  0.2061   0.3608   0.5749   0.6787   0.1471   0.1200  -0.0082   0.0064  
         Factor5 |  0.1264   0.1313   0.0270  -0.3250   0.9250  -0.0406  -0.0554   0.0122  
         Factor6 | -0.0176  -0.0771   0.0093  -0.1250   0.0324   0.9129   0.3771  -0.0372  
         Factor7 |  0.0069   0.0418  -0.0018   0.0447   0.0484  -0.3750   0.9218  -0.0592  
         Factor8 |  0.0042   0.0073  -0.0024   0.0054   0.0089  -0.0108  -0.0695  -0.9974  
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
CZECH REPUBLIC  
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =     1245 
    Method: principal factors                      Retained factors =        7 
    Rotation: orthogonal varimax (Horst off)       Number of params =       98 
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |     Variance   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
        Factor1  |      1.47256      0.16278            0.3538       0.3538 
        Factor2  |      1.30978      0.06704            0.3147       0.6685 
        Factor3  |      1.24274      0.42644            0.2986       0.9672 
        Factor4  |      0.81631      0.37177            0.1961       1.1633 
        Factor5  |      0.44454      0.21565            0.1068       1.2701 
        Factor6  |      0.22890      0.09766            0.0550       1.3251 
        Factor7  |      0.13123            .            0.0315       1.3566 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(136) = 3598.72 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
 
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2   Factor3   Factor4   Factor5   Factor6   Factor7 |   Uniqueness  
    -------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------+-------------- 
            b002 |   0.0245    0.0574    0.0781   -0.0772   -0.4022    0.0606    0.0563 |      0.8154   
            b003 |   0.0754   -0.1094   -0.1722    0.0784    0.4520    0.0696    0.0602 |      0.7337   
            e035 |   0.1591   -0.2552   -0.1915   -0.0385    0.0976    0.2220    0.0043 |      0.8126   
            e036 |  -0.0650    0.6100    0.2699   -0.0211   -0.0027   -0.0630   -0.0360 |      0.5451   
            e037 |  -0.0617    0.4485    0.4757    0.0274   -0.1501    0.0491   -0.0117 |      0.5430   
            e038 |   0.1029    0.0887    0.1803    0.1300    0.0324    0.2992    0.0621 |      0.8377   
            e039 |  -0.0806    0.5421    0.1491    0.0759   -0.0690    0.1489    0.0238 |      0.6442   
            e042 |  -0.0464    0.4770    0.3001   -0.0189    0.0018   -0.1229    0.0130 |      0.6646   
            e043 |  -0.0222    0.2257    0.5876   -0.0025   -0.1018   -0.0266   -0.0149 |      0.5920   
            e044 |  -0.0058    0.2297    0.6045    0.0095    0.0193    0.0272    0.0030 |      0.5806   
            f028 |   0.3513    0.0158    0.1071   -0.1901    0.0021   -0.0025   -0.1854 |      0.7943   
            f103 |  -0.0958    0.0169    0.0086    0.6044    0.0315    0.0166   -0.0176 |      0.6236   
            f105 |  -0.0766    0.0119    0.0096    0.6066    0.0308    0.0054    0.0273 |      0.6242     28 
            f118 |   0.5865   -0.1213   -0.0508   -0.0169    0.1356    0.1057    0.1611 |      0.5830   
            f120 |   0.7136   -0.0592   -0.0274   -0.0835   -0.0423   -0.0009   -0.0165 |      0.4775   
            f122 |   0.5923    0.0137   -0.0026   -0.0395    0.0044   -0.0409   -0.0786 |      0.6396   
            f126 |   0.2659   -0.0647   -0.0288    0.0150    0.0876    0.1527    0.2244 |      0.8427   
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Factor rotation matrix 
 
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 | Factor1  Factor2  Factor3  Factor4  Factor5  Factor6  Factor7  
    -------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor1 | -0.3437   0.6710   0.6244   0.0735  -0.1816  -0.0449  -0.0359  
         Factor2 |  0.8731   0.1880   0.3102  -0.3153  -0.0374   0.0724   0.0019  
         Factor3 |  0.2704   0.0670   0.0791   0.8802   0.2876   0.2041   0.1306  
         Factor4 | -0.0851   0.3945  -0.1859  -0.2790   0.8484   0.0197   0.0673  
         Factor5 | -0.1730  -0.5691   0.6554  -0.1502   0.3247   0.2654   0.1353  
         Factor6 | -0.0922   0.1733  -0.2056  -0.1416  -0.2368   0.7915   0.4654  
         Factor7 | -0.0264   0.0177  -0.0360   0.0078   0.0404   0.5038  -0.8615  
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
AUSTRIA 
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =     1092 
    Method: principal factors                      Retained factors =        9 
    Rotation: orthogonal varimax (Horst off)       Number of params =      135 
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |     Variance   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
        Factor1  |      1.66060      0.13679            0.3942       0.3942 
        Factor2  |      1.52381      0.53473            0.3617       0.7560 
        Factor3  |      0.98908      0.28147            0.2348       0.9908 
        Factor4  |      0.70760      0.28457            0.1680       1.1587 
        Factor5  |      0.42304      0.07063            0.1004       1.2592 
        Factor6  |      0.35241      0.21534            0.0837       1.3428 
        Factor7  |      0.13707      0.10323            0.0325       1.3754 
        Factor8  |      0.03384      0.00902            0.0080       1.3834 
        Factor9  |      0.02481            .            0.0059       1.3893 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(171) = 3085.20 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
 
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2   Factor3   Factor4   Factor5   Factor6   Factor7   Factor8   Factor9 |   Uniqueness  
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+-------------- 
            b002 |  -0.0518   -0.0042   -0.1432    0.4886   -0.0375    0.0432   -0.0041    0.0200    0.0032 |      0.7343   
            b003 |   0.0968   -0.0632    0.1936   -0.4735    0.0530   -0.0369   -0.0144    0.0204   -0.0036 |      0.7201   
            e035 |   0.1217   -0.0592    0.0665   -0.0922    0.2077    0.0986   -0.0175    0.0151    0.1330 |      0.8977     29 
            e036 |  -0.0086    0.5090    0.0556    0.0139    0.1067    0.0646   -0.0926    0.0847    0.0278 |      0.7055   
            e037 |   0.0281    0.5321    0.0278    0.0112   -0.0372   -0.0421    0.1259   -0.0348   -0.0175 |      0.6947   
            e038 |   0.1640    0.1912    0.0518   -0.1481    0.4357   -0.1296    0.0074    0.0045    0.0001 |      0.7052   
            e039 |   0.0148    0.4656    0.1071    0.0308    0.2105    0.0614   -0.1436   -0.0312   -0.0435 |      0.6990   
            e042 |  -0.0714    0.5388    0.0690    0.0097   -0.0781    0.0239   -0.1118   -0.0226    0.0206 |      0.6797   
            e043 |   0.0282    0.4411   -0.0418    0.0467   -0.0046   -0.0474    0.1935   -0.0034   -0.0027 |      0.7610   
            e044 |   0.1691    0.4614    0.0545    0.0076    0.1173   -0.1106    0.1689    0.0186   -0.0176 |      0.7003   
            e143 |  -0.1425    0.0786   -0.0201    0.3400   -0.1733    0.2273   -0.0215    0.0089   -0.0457 |      0.7732   
            e145 |  -0.1336   -0.0106   -0.0794    0.1822   -0.0922    0.3563    0.0092    0.0026    0.0144 |      0.8068   
            f028 |   0.4185    0.0235   -0.2685    0.0725   -0.0047   -0.0412    0.0470    0.1292    0.0116 |      0.7263   
            f103 |  -0.1216    0.0553    0.6271   -0.0578    0.0304   -0.0344   -0.0029    0.0101    0.0178 |      0.5830   
            f105 |  -0.1178    0.0657    0.6298   -0.0946    0.0069    0.0056   -0.0006   -0.0088   -0.0152 |      0.5758   
            f118 |   0.6364   -0.0382   -0.0036   -0.1468    0.1499   -0.1294    0.0344   -0.0389    0.0142 |      0.5298   
            f120 |   0.6806    0.0162   -0.1606   -0.0019    0.0114    0.0070    0.0019    0.0389   -0.0110 |      0.5089   
            f122 |   0.5576    0.0755   -0.0617    0.0261   -0.1057    0.0868   -0.0588   -0.0491    0.0073 |      0.6543   
            f126 |   0.3875    0.0362    0.0292   -0.1485    0.1885   -0.3034    0.0746    0.0125   -0.0048 |      0.6923   
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Factor rotation matrix 
 
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 | Factor1  Factor2  Factor3  Factor4  Factor5  Factor6  Factor7  Factor8  Factor9  
    -------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor1 |  0.8688   0.2568  -0.1331  -0.2261   0.2418  -0.2178   0.0629   0.0205   0.0112  
         Factor2 | -0.2424   0.8475   0.4459  -0.0534   0.1420  -0.0257   0.0100  -0.0114  -0.0128  
         Factor3 |  0.0486   0.4167  -0.6156   0.5923  -0.2100   0.2204   0.0203   0.0249  -0.0234  
         Factor4 |  0.4285  -0.0906   0.5936   0.3667  -0.3725   0.4080  -0.1254  -0.0174   0.0023  
         Factor5 | -0.0057  -0.1775   0.1924   0.6552   0.6383  -0.2906   0.0872   0.0502   0.0155  
         Factor6 | -0.0066  -0.0092  -0.1191  -0.1405   0.5291   0.6263  -0.5263   0.0302   0.1263  
         Factor7 | -0.0048  -0.0385   0.0158  -0.0986   0.1844   0.4881   0.8294   0.0848   0.1454  
         Factor8 | -0.0164   0.0132   0.0255  -0.0123  -0.0993  -0.0816  -0.0776   0.9471   0.2816  
         Factor9 |  0.0068  -0.0253   0.0063  -0.0428   0.0857   0.1238   0.0356   0.3016  -0.9394  
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
HUNGARY 
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =      558 
    Method: principal factors                      Retained factors =        6 
    Rotation: orthogonal varimax (Horst off)       Number of params =       75 
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |     Variance   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
        Factor1  |      1.25336      0.22729            0.4361       0.4361 
        Factor2  |      1.02607      0.19552            0.3570       0.7932 
        Factor3  |      0.83054      0.38441            0.2890       1.0822 
        Factor4  |      0.44613      0.05607            0.1552       1.2374 
        Factor5  |      0.39006      0.10474            0.1357       1.3731 
        Factor6  |      0.28532            .            0.0993       1.4724   30 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(105) = 1002.63 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
 
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2   Factor3   Factor4   Factor5   Factor6 |   Uniqueness  
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------+-------------- 
            b002 |  -0.0150    0.0079    0.0984    0.0322    0.0929    0.3438 |      0.8621   
            b003 |   0.0762    0.0450   -0.1414   -0.0509   -0.0905   -0.3127 |      0.8636   
            e037 |  -0.0926    0.0088    0.5695    0.0266    0.0215    0.1016 |      0.6555   
            e038 |   0.0859   -0.0379    0.2613    0.1004   -0.3139   -0.0373 |      0.8129   
            e039 |  -0.0389    0.0976    0.3139   -0.0567   -0.1037   -0.1882 |      0.8410   
            e042 |  -0.0979    0.0112    0.4633   -0.0328    0.1145   -0.0485 |      0.7591   
            e143 |  -0.2291    0.0591    0.2060   -0.0058    0.3764    0.0860 |      0.7525   
            e145 |  -0.2130    0.0221    0.1891    0.0700    0.3118    0.0731 |      0.8109   
            f028 |   0.0975   -0.2978    0.0713    0.3170   -0.0515    0.0693 |      0.7888   
            f103 |  -0.1139    0.6666   -0.0223   -0.0644    0.0164   -0.0219 |      0.5373   
            f105 |   0.0675    0.6623    0.0491   -0.0255    0.0044    0.0150 |      0.5535   
            f118 |   0.6836   -0.0169   -0.0820    0.0650   -0.0288   -0.0067 |      0.5205   
            f120 |   0.3353   -0.1512   -0.0362    0.4093    0.0383    0.0357 |      0.6931   
            f122 |   0.2505   -0.1167    0.0228    0.3775   -0.0401   -0.0094 |      0.7789   
            f126 |   0.6729   -0.0206   -0.0176    0.0538   -0.0680   -0.0129 |      0.5388   
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Factor rotation matrix 
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 | Factor1  Factor2  Factor3  Factor4  Factor5  Factor6  
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
         Factor1 |  0.7835  -0.4076  -0.2760   0.3074  -0.2182  -0.0405  
         Factor2 | -0.2928  -0.7774   0.4382   0.2448   0.1577   0.1820  
         Factor3 |  0.4020   0.3915   0.7897   0.2302   0.0208   0.0899  
         Factor4 |  0.0816   0.1689  -0.2970   0.3079   0.6825   0.5621  
         Factor5 | -0.3630   0.2183  -0.1413   0.8022  -0.3933  -0.0495  
         Factor6 |  0.0187  -0.0070   0.0024   0.2330   0.5537  -0.7992  
    -------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 